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Although the Mexican economy has been
growing since the third quarter of 1995, the
banking sector remains in serious financial straits
whose resolution, the government estimates, will
ultimately absorb the equivalent of 8 percent of
current annual gross domestic product (GDP).
Indeed, despite Mexico’s recovery, domestic bank-
ing fragility strains Mexico’s ability to finance a
deepening and diversifying of this recovery
among smaller and mid-sized firms, which lack
large firms’ access to international capital markets.
This article details the events that precipi-
tated and followed Mexico’s financial crisis and
examines how the problems took shape. Although
Mexico’s banking crisis is closely related to the
December 1994 peso devaluation, its foundations
were laid much earlier. In fact, there is much to
suggest that Mexico’s devaluation occurred in part
because the optimal policies for resolving an in-
cipient banking crisis contradicted the require-
ments for maintaining a pegged exchange rate.
Very recently, a literature has developed
that not only addresses the banking crisis but
also deals with Mexico’s difficulties in a micro-
economic financial industry context. Despite its
Mexican focus, this literature has much to say
about microeconomic problems that can ensue
in the wake of any financial liberalization.
According to this literature, monitoring
potential problem loans is especially difficult
when—as in Mexico in the early 1990s—
euphoric investor behavior and a rising economy
make identifying risky borrowers more difficult.
When foreign capital departs, what always had
been risky behavior suddenly becomes more
obvious. This monitoring problem, which not
only regulators but the banks themselves face,
helps explain the suddenness of some banking
crises—that is, when anything goes wrong,
everything does (Hausmann and Gavin 1995).
An important backdrop for this monitor-
ing problem in Mexico—and the attendant in-
rush of capital and its subsequent outflow—was
the behavior of its banks in the wake of financial
liberalization. For Mexican banks, Gruben and
McComb (1996) find—as Shaffer (1993) finds
for Canadian banks in the wake of liberalization
in the 1980s—behavior consistent with a
postderegulation struggle for market share. In
these struggles, a typical bank extends financial
services more aggressively in the short run than
it would in the long run.  It may lend so expan-
sively in the short and medium run that marginal
costs exceed marginal revenue. The bank may
be encouraged in this by the apparently strong
balance sheets of borrowers for whom what
may appear a permanent improvement in for-22
tunes ultimately turns out to have been tempo-
rary (Hausmann and Gavin 1995).
In such periods, not one but a collection of
phenomena may conspire to send illusory mes-
sages. Banks may engage in herd behavior as
lenders send unrealistically positive signals about
the economy to one another and as the eu-
phoric flow of foreign capital into the nation’s
financial markets (common following a liberal-
ization) temporarily sends signals that some may
wrongly take to be permanent (Gonzalez-
Hermosillo, Pazarba sio˘ glu, and Billings 1996;
McKinnon and Pill 1996; Ostos Jaye 1996).
What distinguishes more recent literature
on this topic from what appeared in the past is
that more of the recent literature details this
behavior empirically. This allows the statistical
characterization of expansive behavior as it hap-
pens, in contrast to the more traditional verbal
descriptions of what may be easy to identify
when the crash comes but is hard to prove
convincingly beforehand.
To put Mexico’s recent experience in con-
text, we detail the government’s previous, finan-
cial repression approach to regulation, examine
the Mexican financial system of the 1980s, and
consider the privatization of the early 1990s and
its aftermath. We characterize the banking crisis
as it began to materialize before the devaluation
of December 1994 and follow with the denoue-
ment of 1995, which included programs that not
only preserved depositors’ assets (the banks’
liabilities) but also, strange to relate, the assets
of the banks’ stockholders.
The nationalization of Mexico’s
commercial banks
To elucidate the causes and effects of the
Mexican financial system’s volatile trajectory, we
open with the end of the Lopez Portillo admin-
istration in 1982, the first year of real economic
decline since 1932. Faced with increasing pres-
sure against the peso and attendant capital flight,
the administration forgot the real reasons capital
flees a country, blamed the banks, and national-
ized them. To make sure the banks stayed that
way, Lopez Portillo incorporated the national-
ization into the constitution.
The government’s new prisoner was an ill
one. The banks were suffering the effects of
falling oil prices, bursts of exchange rate insta-
bility, and, ultimately, regulatory oversight prob-
lems, evidenced in retrospect by extensive
self-lending. Mexico recapitalized the banks and
began to consolidate them. Of the fifty-eight
originally nationalized, only eighteen remained
by 1990 (Banco de México 1992).
Broadening and deepening
the financial markets
A financial crisis had preceded the bank
nationalizations in 1982. The problems included
an accumulation of government debt Mexico
was hard put to pay. For years thereafter, gov-
ernment domestic borrowing crowded out pri-
vate borrowing. The government absorbed
domestic credit by decree, imposing heavy re-
serve requirements on the banking system and
allowing them to be fulfilled only by the pur-
chase of government debt. In 1986, for example,
more than 60 percent of net bank credit flowed
to the government.
Crowding out was only part of the banking
system’s problem, however. Until the late 1980s,
Mexico was a classic case of general financial
repression.1 Not only did the government force
banks to lend to it, but it maintained interest rate
ceilings on bank assets and liabilities and dic-
tated lending quotas to what it deemed high-
priority economic sectors. (See the box entitled
“Financial Repression.”)
One of the key events in Mexico’s finan-
cial development of the 1980s was the gov-
ernment’s move to facilitate an increase in
nonbank financial intermediation. This move
served as a first step in both ending financial
repression and increasing the system’s ability
to capture national assets for intermediation.
When Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado replaced
Jose Lopez Portillo as president in 1982, the new
administration would not privatize the newly
public banks; nationalized banking was pro-
tected by the constitution.
But perhaps everything those banks did
was not really banking. In 1984, the de la Madrid
administration began to sell off the brokerage
houses, insurance companies, and other bank
operations that did not take deposits and make
loans. Between 1982 and 1988, nonbank finan-
cial institutions’ assets rose from 9.1 percent of
total financial system assets to 32.1 percent.
Also driving nonbank financial institutions’
growth was the rapid expansion of Mexico’s
securities market. This expansion in large part
reflected the increased issuance of cetes—short-
term government debt comparable to U.S. Trea-
sury bills. The point was to create a separate
market for public debt so as to wean the govern-
ment from the banks. Mexico had begun to
issue these instruments in 1978, but it was not
until the de la Madrid administration that they be-
came major funding sources for the government.
By the late 1980s, the Mexican money
market had become liquid and sophisticated.
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the Mexican government no longer relied on
commercial bank financing. The 1988–89 bi-
ennium was among the most significant for
financial liberalization in Mexico and for atten-
dant broadening and deepening of financial
markets there. Important events included not
only the development of the money market but
also the freeing of interest rates on bank assets
and liabilities, the elimination of priority lending
quotas, and, ultimately, the phaseout of both
reserve requirements and liquidity coefficients.
Moreover, banks were given greater opportunity
to compete with brokerage houses, which had
been taking market share from the banks at a
rapid rate.
In 1990, more options became available.
Under Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who in 1988
succeeded de la Madrid as president, the
Mexican congress amended the constitution to
permit the sale of the nationalized banks,
although only to Mexicans. Soon after, a new
Financial Groups Law was passed, heading the
banks back toward the universal banking system
to which they had been moving before the 1982
nationalization. Under universal banking—com-
mon in Europe but illegal in the United States—
the same holding company may control an
insurance company, a bank, a brokerage house,
a leasing company, a factoring company, a bond-
ing company, a mutual funds management com-
pany, a currency exchange broker, and a
warehousing company.
Reprivatizing the banks
The government sold its eighteen banks in
fourteen months—June 1991 through July 1992—
at the extraordinarily high average price-to-book-
value ratio of 3.49. Mexico used the proceeds to
pay down the public debt left over from the
financial crisis of the 1980s. Both anecdotal and
econometric evidence (Lopez de Silanes and
Zamarripa 1995) suggests that the buyers—
financial groups and brokerage houses
mostly—may have paid those high prices
because they expected only very limited com-
petition between banks. With eighteen newly
privatized banks, plus two others that for par-
ticular reasons had never been nationalized,
there were only twenty commercial banks tak-
ing deposits and lending in Mexico. Even among
these twenty, market power was highly concen-
trated. At the time the last of the banks was
privatized, the three largest accounted for about
three-fifths of all Mexican bank assets. More-
over, profits were high. In 1992, when the gov-
ernment sold the last of its commercial banks,
the net return on assets for Mexican banks was
approximately 1.45 percent, versus 0.91 percent
for U.S. banks.
The new owners managed to mark loan
rates up significantly above their cost of funds.
Over the first five months of 1991, when the
eighteen banks were still public, the spread
between average cost of funds and average lend-
ing rate ranged from 5.31 percentage points to
6.29. During the last five months of 1992, when
the eighteen banks were all private, spreads
ranged from 8.09 percentage points to 10.69—
even though inflation rates were lower in 1992
than in 1991. The spreads widened because
banks paid depositors lower interest rates in late
1992 than in early 1991, while the interest rates
they charged borrowers were higher than they
had been.
By the date of the privatizations, some
bank performance measures had already im-
proved compared with the middle and late 1980s.
Financial Repression
To understand the implications of Mexican financial liberalization, it is useful
to understand the implications of what occurred before liberalization—and to
understand them in a general sense. The term for not only Mexico’s but many
developing countries’ historical approach to dealing with financial institutions is
financial repression. It is easy to understand why.
Developing countries have historically been more aggressive than industrial-
ized countries in their detailed control of banks. In general, governments in both
developed and developing countries attempt to pursue prudential regulation of their
banking systems and may impose controls on the banks’ exchange rate exposure.
But developing countries have by tradition more actively controlled banks’ interest
rates on deposits, how much and to which industrial sectors the banks lent, and
bank lending rates.
Developing countries, and certainly Mexico, traditionally have imposed far
higher reserve requirements than developed countries. The reason appears to have
little to do with the common textbook discussions, in which required reserve ratios
are policy instruments used to restrict monetary growth.1 The purpose has typically
been to capture the resources of the banking system by force. Historically, other
capital markets were not adequately developed to fund governments at the level to
which they wished to become accustomed. The reserve requirements could be met
by the purchase of government, but not private, debt.2
Similarly, in Mexico and in many other developing countries, ceilings on
interest rates paid on deposits and for loans played an important role. Low deposit
rates have the advantage of allowing banks to charge low loan rates, whereas loan
rate ceilings force them to do so. More generally, Mexican policy for a long time
officially directed bank funding to certain prescribed economic sectors—the
government, of course, being one of them.
The problem with financial repression, of course, is that the public has many
options when it wants to purchase assets. Many of these—the purchase of inflation
hedges such as land, gold, and jewelry—are not very efficient forms of financial
intermediation. That is, they are not very effective at channeling investment funds
from those with a surplus to those with productive ideas but a funding deficit. High
financial repression typically means that the banking system manages to capture
only a relatively small portion of public assets. The ultimate social cost can be a
lack of investment.
1 Fry (1995) notes that over the period 1978–87, the ratio of bank reserves to bank deposits averaged 21.2
percent in ninety-one developing countries, compared with 7.1 percent in nineteen industrialized countries,
meaning that the ratio of reserves to deposits was three times as high in the developing countries. On the
issue of whether developing countries use high reserve requirements as instruments of restrictive monetary
policy, Fry also notes that cross-country comparisons indicate high simple correlations between monetary
growth or inflation and the ratio of bank reserves to deposits.
2 Indeed, because the resources of banking systems are often easier for governments to attach in this way than
other resources of financial systems, governments in developing countries often use rules, regulations, and
charges to inhibit the development of nonbank finance.24
For example, the banking system’s ability to
capture the nation’s assets for intermediation
had increased markedly. Despite an increasing
ability not only to attract funds but to generate
profits, low efficiency persisted. At the end of
1991, a common measure of bank efficiency—
the noninterest expense to total assets ratio—
was 5.3 in Mexico, compared with 3.6 percent in
the United States.
Marketing seems not to have received
much attention either. In 1991, Mexico had one
bank branch for about every 18,000 people. In
the United States, the number was about one
branch per 4,000 and in Europe, about one for
every 2,000.
These factors probably help explain why
financial penetration, a measure of the degree to
which savings are channeled through the finan-
cial system to provide financing for investment,
was also low in Mexico. As measured by M4/
GDP (where M4 is currency, checking accounts
and other short-term deposits, bankers accep-
tances, long-term bank deposits, and govern-
ment bonds held by the public), financial
penetration grew markedly in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Nevertheless, by 1992 it was still
only 46.1 percent, compared with 97 percent in
Canada, 93 percent in the United States, and 71
percent in Italy.2
Increasing financial market competitiveness
If the high price-to-book ratios they
paid meant buyers of Mexico’s commercial
banks in 1991 and 1992 expected competitive-
ness to continue at these low levels, 1993 would
be a surprise. After cutting the number of banks
in the 1980s, Mexico began to open its markets
to new domestic entrants in 1993. By 1994, a
total of thirty-five Mexican-owned banks
(including the eighteen privatized in 1991–92)
had charters.
The wave of domestic bank charters that
began to roll in 1993 was followed by another,
of foreign applicants, in 1994. Before 1994, the
only foreign bank chartered to operate as a
deposit-taking and lending institution in Mexico
in the 1990s was Citibank. But in 1994, new
bank regulations attendant to the implementa-
tion of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) allowed foreign-owned banks to
operate in Mexico, although market share maxima
would greatly restrict their opportunities.
Pressures on the system: Exogenous
The prospect of increasing competition,
together with the consolidation of organizational
changes, led to noticeable alterations in Mexico’s
commercial banking system. Between Decem-
ber 1991 and December 1994, the number of
bank branches grew by one-eighth, while total
bank employment slipped and then fell hard.
Measures of efficiency, including the ratio of
noninterest expenses as a share of assets, edged
downward. Although improvement was slow, it
still was improvement.
But other pressures began to cause diffi-
culties for the banking system. As part of Mexi-
co’s efforts toward productive efficiency and
low inflation in the late 1980s, the country had
not only lowered trade barriers but had also
followed an exchange-rate-based inflation stabi-
lization policy. The government fixed the ex-
change rate during 1988. The next year, Mexico
commenced a crawling-peg regime in which the
peso’s rate of depreciation against the dollar was
lower than the differential between the two
countries’ inflation rates.
The resulting increase in the real exchange
rate, together with the trade apertures that had
begun in the late 1980s, caused international
competition that discouraged producers of
tradeable products from raising their prices.
The nontradeable products sectors, including
real estate and construction-related industries
together with various service producers, were
less sensitive to such discipline. By definition,
nontradeable products are those that have little
if any foreign competition. But nontradeable
products are typically among the inputs trade-
ables producers use to make their products.
When nontradeables producers raised their
prices, they imposed a squeeze between costs
to and selling prices of tradeable goods pro-
ducers. The squeeze on these producers soon
began to have implications for the banks that
had lent them money.
Another important bank-related detail of
Mexico’s economic policy was related to the
increasingly negative balance of trade. To main-
tain dollar reserves to defend the exchange rate,
and to create capital inflows that would offset
the outflows of funds to buy imports, Mexico
held interest rates relatively high. Real interest
rates rose during 1992 and 1993, making it more
difficult for borrowers to repay their typically
variable-rate loans.
Pressures on the system: Endogenous
In addition to pressures from outside
sources, the banking system incurred self-
inflicted wounds. When it was privatized in
1991–92, a widespread concern was that the
system was not only not very competitive by
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it would be. While privatization was expected
to ameliorate some measures of inefficiency,
Mansell Carstens (1993a) argues that among the
reasons the spread between banks’ interest rates
on loans and their cost of funds could be ex-
pected to remain high for years is the high
degree of oligopoly power in the provision of
bank services.3
Gavito Mohar, Sánchez Garcia, and Tri-
gueros Legarreta (1992) express similar concern
about the anticompetitive implications of con-
centration in the Mexican commercial banking
system, while Gavito and Trigueros (1993) argue
that “some additional measures would be useful
to induce greater competition.” Gruben and
Welch (1996) suggest that not only is Mexico’s
banking system not very competitive but that
the high price-to-book ratios paid by the banks’
new owners signal that they expected bank-
ing’s industrial organization to remain relatively
uncompetitive.
In sum, while Mexico’s bank privatizations
and the financial liberalizations that preceded,
paralleled, and followed them were seen as
offering greater opportunities for competitive-
ness, the high levels of bank concentration and
the wide spreads between banks’ cost of funds
and interest rates on loans were taken to mean
that years might pass before these opportunities
were seized. NAFTA might ultimately allow
greater competitive pressures in Mexico; so might
the decrease in restrictions on starting new banks
(Gavito and Trigueros 1993). All of this would
take time, possibly much time.
But if this literature implies that Mexican
banks would be underloaning for years so they
could overcharge, a parallel literature on finan-
cial liberalization in developing countries points
toward overloaning. Under this paradigm, the
problem would not be inadequate expansion of
credit but too much expansion. The excessive-
ness would become recognizable ex post in a
wave of loan defaults followed by other typical
artifacts of a banking crisis.4
In this paradigm of financial liberalization,
the large spreads between cost of funds and
interest rates on loans need not suggest uncom-
petitive behavior. Instead, when a repressed
financial system is liberalized, the banks are
unable to supply intermediation services effi-
ciently because they lack expertise, qualified
human resources, and adequate technology.
The result is high intermediation costs, rep-
resented by a large spread between cost of
funds and interest rates charged (de la Cuadra
and Valdés 1992). Newly liberalized banks’
portfolios become riskier because the banks
cannot evaluate the riskiness of loans and
higher real interest rates under the new regime.
Not only may lending expertise be scarce in
general, but banks may lack experience with
the new types of markets their increased funds
permit them to enter.5
Consistent with this latter paradigm, the
econometric results in Gruben and McComb
(1996) suggest that what Shaffer (1993) has called
a “supercompetitive” market materialized follow-
ing the Mexican privatizations, as bank owners
stretched their capital and deposits in efforts to
swell loan portfolios in a manner consistent with
short-run efforts to expand market share. That
is, in the short run banks actually lent so much
that they passed the point where marginal cost
equaled marginal revenue, to a point where mar-
ginal cost exceeded marginal revenue. Of course,
this is a relation that banks could never sustain
in the long run.6 Indeed, in the wake of priva-
tization, there was much evidence to suggest
banks began to expand consumer credit despite
limited information on the creditworthiness of
the borrowers. Well-organized credit reporting
systems, so common in the United States, oper-
ated on only a very limited scale in Mexico.7
This behavior may be seen as just one part
of an overall episode of lender and investor
euphoria during the period that has been well
characterized econometrically in an endogenous
bubbles model of investor behavior by Ostos
Jaye (1996). Here, euphoria is defined in the
sense that Minsky (1982) uses it: banks allow
their liquidity levels to be reduced and accept
obligations that in other circumstances they would
have rejected.
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarba sio˘ glu, and
Billings (1996) draw similar conclusions from an
econometric model of banking system conta-
gion effects, as these effects were expressed
in Mexico’s financial crisis. Their model sug-
gests that contagion effects work through two
channels: (1) through information asymmetries
affecting depositor behavior and (2) as a result
of herd behavior in bank risk-taking.
Lopez de Silanes and Zamarripa (1995)
offer econometric results that suggest bank de-
regulation increased financial activity levels be-
cause of freer operating rules, while privatization
led to a restructuring of operations, with a large
increase in the loan portfolio growth rate and—
importantly—a reduction in the securities port-
folio growth rate. They also argue that the slow
opening of the banking system to domestic de
novo operations and foreign entry permitted
greater than competitive profits for at least some
institutions in the wake of privatization.26
Regulatory problems
The rush of loan expansion, incomplete
consumer credit assessment, and stresses result-
ing in the overvaluation of the currency con-
verged to make loan defaults more common.
Commercial banks’ ratio of past-due to total
loans and discounts rose from 5.5 in December
1992 to 8.3 in September 1994.8 At the time, 8.3
seemed very high.
The euphoria that prompted increasing
amounts of capital to flow into the system cre-
ated problems for both financial regulators and
the banks themselves. The problem during a
strong economic upturn, as Hausmann and Gavin
(1995) characterize it, is that the abundance of
liquidity masks risky borrowers who would be
recognized for what they are in less florid times.
Problems in the banks that became visible
in the wake of privatization motivated specula-
tive activity that weakened the banks further.
Although universal banking systems like Mexico’s
present special regulatory problems involving
what might be considered self-lending, Mexican
accounting standards did not require consoli-
dated reporting until 1995, making it difficult to
establish limits on lending within financial groups.
Moreover, increasingly sophisticated trading in
derivatives allowed highly leveraged and risky
currency plays to be presented quite legally to
regulators as conservative investments in which
dollar-denominated assets were matched by dol-
lar-denominated liabilities (Garber 1996).
A related but more general regulatory prob-
lem may be inferred—as Gunther, Moore, and
Short (1996) argue—from the preprivatization
increase in past-due loans (from less than 1
percent at year-end 1988 to more than 3 percent
at year-end 1991) while the capital-to-asset ratio
declined (from 7 to 5.4 percent). They note that,
considering Mexican banks typically rolled over
past-due interest into the principal at maturity
and recorded the capitalized interest as income,
the deterioration in these measures, together
with the simultaneous decline in return on
assets, suggests marked financial difficulties.
These elements of forbearance before privati-
zation may have predisposed bank purchasers
to expect such forbearance after privatization,
which is what occurred.
Moreover, Mexican regulations do not im-
pose upon shareholders the consequences of
their banks’ behavior as fully as do those of the
United States. In at least one case, shareholders
of a failed Mexican bank were not only per-
mitted to retain equity interest after the bank’s
acquisition by another institution, but the Mexi-
can government provided guarantees that pro-
tected the purchaser from losses on existing
loans. Thus, Mexico not only preserved deposi-
tors’ assets but, to some degree, the assets of the
bank’s stockholders.
The exchange rate crisis
During the Salinas administration, which
commenced in December 1988, the rationali-
zation of Mexico’s fiscal, monetary, financial,
investment, and trade policies—together with
relatively high real interest rates in Mexico
and low rates in the United States—precipitated
large inflows of foreign capital. Mexico could
use the resulting accumulations of foreign
currency reserves to defend the peso. Capital
inflows covered—and to a certain extent
caused—the increasingly negative balance on
current account.
By the first quarter of 1994, foreign cur-
rency reserves were approaching $30 billion,
after having fallen below $5 billion in March
1990. Investor optimism about Mexico’s policies
was so high that, when rebels occupied San
Cristobal de las Casas in January, the markets
shook off the shock and capital poured in.
Mexico’s presidential election was to take
place in August, however. When Institutional
Revolutionary Party candidate Luis Donaldo
Colossio was assassinated in March, the killing
triggered massive capital outflows. Foreign cur-
rency reserves fell from $29.3 billion in February
to $16.5 billion in June.
Thereafter, the markets seemed to settle
down. From June until mid-November, reserves
fluctuated occasionally but not by very much. In
October, however, an assassin had killed Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party official Carlos Fran-
cisco Ruiz Massieu. His brother Mario, an official
in the attorney general’s office, was appointed
to investigate the case. In mid-November, he
resigned, complaining that his efforts were be-
ing obstructed. Reserves began to fall hard—
from $17.667 billion at the end of October to
$12.889 billion by the end of November. On
December 20, Finance Secretary Jaime Serra
Puche announced that the peso would devalue
from 3.47 pesos per dollar to 3.99. This was not
really a change in exchange rate regime, gov-
ernment officials explained; it was just an adjust-
ment. The crawling-peg regime would remain in
place, they said.
But would it? Investors knew that nearly
$17 billion in dollar-indexed Mexican bonds were
scheduled to mature in the first six months of
1995. Foreign currency reserves had not been
that high for more than a month, and who knew
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their bonds? Market participants precipitated a
run on the peso, and two days after announcing
the crawling-peg regime would remain in place,
the government announced, late on December
22, that the peso would float. The peso–dollar
exchange rate quickly headed toward 5 to 1.
Reserves fell from $12.889 billion at the end of
November to $6.278 billion by the end of De-
cember and to $4.440 billion by the end of
January 1995.
The financial industry after the devaluation
The devaluation triggered capital outflows
and high inflation. Interest rates rose so high
that they not only put borrowers at risk but—
because major interest rate increases push up
loan default rates—imperiled lenders as well.
To squeeze inflation out of the system, the
central bank began to restrict domestic credit to
the commercial banking system and slow growth
in the monetary aggregates. After some initially
ginger efforts, the Bank of Mexico imposed highly
restrictive credit and monetary policies in Febru-
ary and early March. Mortgage rates that had
been 22 percent in November rose to 74 percent
in early March. Also in March, the interbank loan
rate briefly rose to 114 percent.
Under these conditions, even an inexperi-
enced banker could foresee a new wave of
past-due loans. Some analysts claimed that
problem loans had doubled between December
1994 and March 1995.9 Some banks reportedly
suspended all mortgage, auto, and consumer
loans until further notice and canceled loans to
farmers for replacement parts and seeds for
spring planting.10
As loan problems mounted, the govern-
ment took steps not only to rescue the banks
but to facilitate their purchase. NAFTA had de-
creed that, during the six-year transition begin-
ning January 1, 1994, a U.S. or Canadian financial
institution could acquire an existing Mexican
bank only if it did not account for more than 1.5
percent of total Mexican bank capital. This rule
meant that, at the time of NAFTA’s ratification,
only two Mexican banks were eligible for direct
acquisition.11
Beginning in February 1995, a new Mexi-
can law permitted foreign banking organizations
to purchase Mexican banks that accounted
for up to 6 percent of total Mexican bank
capital (capital neto), legalizing purchase of all
but Mexico’s three largest institutions. That
this step was part of a bank rescue package is
evidenced by the 6 percent rule’s application
only to bank acquisitions. A foreign-owned
startup bank would still have to follow the old
1.5 percent rule. That is, while it remained
unacceptable to start a bank large enough to
account for 6 percent of Mexican bank capital, it
became acceptable to purchase and rescue a
problem bank that big.
NAFTA had also imposed limits on total
bank capital that all foreign-controlled banks
could hold. Under NAFTA rules, the limit in 1995
would have been 9 percent. The new Mexican
banking law raised this limit to 25 percent.
To address the mounting undercapitaliza-
tion problems of a growing number of banks,
the government designed a special recapitaliza-
tion program known as PROCAPTE. Under
PROCAPTE, troubled banks could raise capital
by creating and selling subordinated convertible
debentures (bonds) to the nation’s deposit in-
surance authority, FOBAPROA. The debentures
would mature in five years. The government set
criteria for converting the debentures to equity if
the bank turned out to be poorly managed or
if insolvency was judged likely. Although this
condition would make FOBAPROA (which is
administered by Mexico’s central bank) a com-
mercial bank shareholder, the government has
committed itself to sell such instruments as soon
as they become shares.
In another effort to refinance the banks,
Mexico introduced a round-robin program in
which (1) banks repackage and restructure cer-
tain types of past-due private debt into bondlike
instruments; (2) the government purchases this
repackaged debt, issuing special bonds to raise
the money for the purchases; and (3) the banks
purchase these special government bonds. An
important characteristic of the restructured debt
is that it is denominated in so-called Unidades
de Inversion (UDIs), whose nominal value is
indexed to the inflation rate so as to preserve
real value.
Although the program, in a sense, simply
trades one type of bond for another, it spreads
the impact of current losses over time. The plan
permits problem banks to restructure (often
short-term) past-due loans adjudged likely to
pay out ultimately. Under the restructuring pro-
gram, commercial loan maturities are extended
to a range of five to twelve years. Mortgage
loans are also subject to restructuring.
Conclusion
The Mexican financial market has changed
significantly since the bank nationalization of 1982.
First, the banking system has been privatized.
Second, the banks have returned to universal
banking and have turned away from the nar-
rower version of banking the government man-28
dated during the early and middle 1980s. Third,
after consolidating under nationalization, the
number of banks has increased substantially
since privatization. Some signs that suggest in-
creased competitiveness have surfaced. Fourth,
during this period the government has weaned
itself away from the banks as a dominant form of
funding and created a modern securities market.
Even so, 1994 saw a crisis, just as 1982
had. Bad debts had become a serious problem
in the two years before the December 1994
devaluation, and the problem grew substan-
tially worse thereafter. The banking problems
appear to be the outgrowth of aggressive
lending activity that was consistent with a
struggle for market share. Banking services
were produced up to a level where marginal
cost exceeded marginal revenue. Such seem-
ingly shortsighted behavior could have had
positive long-run consequences for market
share under a happier ultimate scenario than
actually occurred.
Moreover, the supervisory and regulatory
framework was inadequate to keep up with
banks’ acquisition of increasingly risky loan port-
folios or to monitor highly leveraged trades in
the financial derivatives markets.
In addition, inasmuch as past-due interest
was rolled over into the principal at maturity
and capitalized interest was recorded as income,
regulatory forbearance of problem loans and
risky behavior was built into the system before
privatization and remained afterward. Such for-
bearance is often described as imposing risk on
the public without corresponding reward (Kane
1989, 1986; Akerlof and Romer 1993).
Although international markets initially
reacted in 1994 and 1995 as they had in 1982,
clear policy differences emerged. The govern-
ment took steps to resuscitate the banks without
nationalizing them. The Mexican government
devised plans to bail out the banks through the
rescheduling and securitization of their loan port-
folios and also attempted to facilitate the pur-
chase of existing banks.
In addition, the structure of Mexico’s non-
financial private sector was different enough
in 1995 to offer a prognosis for the financial
market different from that of 1982. As with
other Latin American countries, the 1980s were
a “lost decade” for Mexico, whose exports were
dominated by raw materials sales and whose
domestic production was state-dominated,
heavily regulated, and inefficient. Since then,
Mexico’s newly rationalized manufacturing
sector has greatly increased its share of the
nation’s exports.
While the devaluation has aggravated
Mexico’s financial problems, it has had a more
positive effect on the country’s manufacturing
sector than the 1980s devaluations had on the
oil industry. The earlier devaluations did not
affect Mexico’s ability to profit from oil sales
then. In real-dollar terms, oil prices have not
reached their levels of the middle to late 1970s
and very early 1980s. But the 1994 devaluation
appears to have raised the profitability of a large
number of Mexico’s manufacturing industries.
Indeed, devaluation allows manufacturers to raise
their peso prices enough to beat the cost–price
squeeze discussed above and yet remain com-
petitive on world markets in dollar prices.
Mexico’s economic restructuring over the past
decade has made its nonfinancial sector more
resilient in the face of economic shocks over the
long run and, accordingly, has made its financial
sector more resilient.
Nevertheless, financial operating ratios,
spreads between cost of funds and loan rates,
and the other characteristics of Mexico’s bank-
ing system suggest that its financial sector has
some distance to go before it meets developed-
country standards.
Notes
1 For more comprehensive discussions of this issue, see
Mansell Carstens (1995a and 1993a).
2 See Mansell Carstens (1993a) for fuller discussion of
this issue.
3 When the Mexican commercial banking system was
nationalized in 1982, there were sixty Mexican banks,
of which fifty-eight were nationalized. To capture
perceived economies of scale, the government
reorganized the industry by merging its fifty-eight
banks into eighteen. Although the industry had been
consolidating during the period leading up to 1982,
these mergers significantly increased concentration.
Accordingly, the system emerged from its state
ownership under a considerably different structure
than prevailed in 1982.
4 Gorton (1992) characterizes the common trajectory
after financial liberalization and the appearance of new
or newly private banks as involving rapid increases in
bank assets, while de Juan (1995) notes that when
new owners take control of a bank, increases in
lending relative to the value of equity capital or deposit
base are common. Whether or not these liberalizations
and related rapid loan expansions are followed by
large increases in loan defaults, as they are in Gorton’s
and de Juan’s characterizations, a common adjunct to
liberalization is often said to be markedly increased
competition in the banking system (International
Monetary Fund 1993).
5 It should be noted that while bank privatization was anFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       29       ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1997
important financial market reform, it was by no means
the only one. Beginning in November 1988 and largely
finishing in 1990, Mexico removed controls on interest
rates on bank liabilities and assets, eliminated sector-
by-sector quotas and all other obligatory or targeted
lending, and phased out reserve requirements and
liquidity coefficients. Moreover, as Mansell Carstens
(1995a) notes, in 1988 20 percent of Mexican govern-
ment financing came from the banking system, but by
1993 all such financing occurred in the money market.
To offer another perspective, in 1988 only 25 percent
of bank lending was unrestricted, with the rest required
as credits to the federal government, as deposits in the
central bank, or as other obligatory credits. By 1990,
the year before the privatizations began, 70 percent of
bank lending was unrestricted and by 1991, 100
percent was. After the Mexican government sold off
the existing commercial banks in 1991–92, the estab-
lishment of new private-sector banks began in 1993,
while the introduction of NAFTA in 1994 permitted
foreigners to establish new banks  or purchase smaller
existing institutions, and the financial crisis that began
in 1994 motivated in 1995 a liberalization of rules on
foreign acquisition of existing Mexican banks. See, for
example, Gruben and Welch (1996).
6 Despite the obvious possibilities for bad outcomes
from such market share struggles, because of the
tendency toward brand loyalty in consumer finance,
there is much to recommend them if an institution can
survive their early stages. For example, a survey of
U.S. credit card users found that most still use the first
card they got (Wall Street Journal 1996).
7 According to officials of the central bank, after the
privatizations it was not unusual for those taking a
lunchtime walk in nearby Alameda Park to be accosted
by hawkers trying to enroll passersby for credit cards.
8 Although the changes in the past-due loan ratio may
be instructive, the ratios themselves are not easily
compared with U.S. past-due loan ratios. Mexican
banks have traditionally reported as past due only the
actual loan payment that was past due thirty days or
more and not the remaining balance on the loan. In the
United States, if a loan payment is past due ninety
days or more, the entire loan balance is reported as
past due.
9 See Crawford (1995), 4.
10 See El Financiero: International Edition (1995, 26).
11 For further details, see Edmonds (1995) and Gruben,
Welch, and Gunther (1994).
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